Things are not defined by a single common essence ¹, but connected by a series of overlapping similarities.

Ludwig Wittgenstein rejects the idea that words have meaning because they stand for a single common essence.

Instead, meaning arises from the diverse ways words are used in ordinary language — a concept captured by “language-games”.

Wittgenstein asks us to list the many activities we call “games”: board games, card games, ball games, parlor games, computer games, etc.

When we look for one trait that all these share (fun, competition, rules, winning, or make-believe) we fail — some games lack one or more of those traits.

Instead, the members of the category overlap by a series of similarities: two games might share a rule, a pair share a common object, another pair share a competitive structure, and so on.

These overlapping similarities form a web or family resemblance rather than a single definitional essence.

The point: our ability to use the word “game” correctly depends on recognizing patterns of similarity in particular contexts, not on checking a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. This explains why attempts to give strict, analytical definitions often miss how ordinary language actually works and why category boundaries are often fuzzy.